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REFOCUSING THE LENS OF CHILD ADVOCACY 
REFORM ON THE CHILD 
INTRODUCTION 
When placed within family court jurisdiction, children need lawyers. 
Dependency1 cases in the family court—in which parents are accused of 
abusing or neglecting their children—are fraught with constitutional 
tensions regarding the state’s and parents’ rights to regulate the well-being 
of children,2 along with systemic pressures such as federal statutes and 
state funding3 that substantially affect family relationships. Children sit at 
 
 
 1. This Note addresses only dependency proceedings, otherwise known as child protective 
proceedings. This Note does not address delinquency or custody proceedings. 
 2. The United States Supreme Court has generated several landmark opinions that set the 
boundaries between the respective, and often conflicting, constitutional rights of parents and the state 
over children’s well-being. Parents’ right to raise their children has long been established. See Prince 
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“[T]he custody, care and nurture of the child reside first 
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can 
neither supply nor hinder. . . . In recognition of this . . . [our] decisions have respected the private 
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”) (citation omitted); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and 
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing the right under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to “establish a home and bring up children”).  
 However, when the well-being of the child is substantially at stake, the state has powers to enter 
the otherwise private family setting. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 167 (“[T]he state has a wide range of 
power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare; . . . this 
includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction.”); see also Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233–34 (1972) (“[T]he power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise 
claim, may be subject to limitation . . . if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or 
safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens.”); Prince, 321 U.S. at 168 (“The 
state’s authority over children’s activities is broader than over like actions of adults.”). 
 3. The federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) makes children’s safety the primary 
concern in matters involving children’s placement, while significantly placing pressure on state 
funding concerns. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89 (1997) (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). See also LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, CHILDREN, 
PARENTS, AND THE LAW: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JUVENILE 
COURTS 647 (2d ed. 2006). 
[T]he state cannot receive federal foster care funds for the child if a judge finds that removal 
was not necessary to protect the child’s welfare or that reasonable efforts to enable the child 
to remain at home were not made. Judges are, therefore, in something of a dilemma if they 
conclude that an agency has not made reasonable efforts. On the one hand, just making the 
finding has the effect of depriving the agency and thus the children of needed funds. On the 
other hand, failure to make the finding when the facts warrant it undermines the purposes of 
the law. 
Id. The legislative history of ASFA specifies that the act was “designed to produce [an] increase in 
adoptions.” H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 7 (1997). “Rather than abandoning the Federal policy of helping 
troubled families, what is needed is a measured response to allow States to adjust their statutes and 












the heart of these proceedings; indeed they are the very reason for them. 
Facing abrupt state intervention into their family life and the oft-
accompanying physical removal4 from their homes, these children travel a 
tumultuous and uncertain road from the time the alleged abuse or neglect 
occurs until the allegations are resolved. Threatened also with termination 
of parental rights,5 they—for better or worse—face the potential 
permanent loss of their natural family life. The recognition that children 
are not mere property to be tossed between their parents and the state has 
prompted states to require representation of children as independent 
parties. Children possess unique rights and interests—to be free from harm 
and to access relevant social services, among others—that need separate 
advocacy, particularly in light of the frequent conflicts between the 
respective interests of parents and children.6 Though a relatively common 
practice, child representation in dependency proceedings remains both 
inconsistent and disputed across the country.  
Children’s lawyers in dependency proceedings practice in a highly 
specialized and unsettled area of the law. Legislators and experts have not 
agreed on how best to represent children, despite years of discourse 
regarding what role children’s lawyers7 should play. The two most 
prominent schools of thought—those who support lawyers representing 
children’s best interests (best interests lawyers), and those who support 
lawyers treating children as adult clients and advocating the clients’ 
wishes (client-directed lawyers)—highlight the great philosophical 
divergence regarding child advocacy.8 The focus of each camp is 
remarkably different, despite the shared goal of achieving effective child 
representation. Best interests models are configured around the lawyer’s 
 
 
practices so that in some circumstances [“aggravated circumstances”] States . . . [can] move more 
efficiently toward terminating parental rights and placing children for adoption.” Id. 
 4. Theo Liebmann, What’s Missing from Foster Care Reform? The Need for Comprehensive, 
Realistic, and Compassionate Removal Standards, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 141, 144–49 
(2006) (discussing the disruption children face when removed, even temporarily, from their homes 
after an allegation of abuse or neglect). 
 5. See HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 3, at 661. 
 6. Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It Is the “Right” Thing to Do, 27 
PACE L. REV. 869, 899–904 (2007) (discussing how parents’ interests and actions in court can clash 
with children’s interests, particularly in high-conflict cases where parents feel more pressure). Though 
Elrod writes to argue for a client-directed model of child advocacy, her description of children’s 
separate interests reflects the general reasons children were ever deemed to need representatives in 
court. 
 7. For simplicity, unless otherwise specified, all references in this Note to attorneys or child 
representation refer only to child advocacy in dependency proceedings. 
 8. For detailed discussion regarding the debate between best interests and client-directed 













decision making, whereas the alternative client-directed models focus on 
how to advance the child’s decision making.  
Years of efforts to clarify the role of child advocates reveal an 
inherently problematic focus: they center on lawyers, not children. Recent 
reform efforts have manifested in several model standards,9 which are in 
significant conflict with one another. However, the common thread among 
these standards as well as among state laws is that they are generally 
designed to clarify the lawyers’ role in an attempt to better represent 
children. By primarily focusing on how to clear lawyers’ confusion 
regarding how to represent their clients, rather than focusing on how to 
increase, or at least optimize, children’s participation in the proceeding, 
the standards have diminished children’s voices. Such diminishment not 
only devalues the child as a party, despite the child’s access to separate 
representation, but it also deprives the court of potentially critical 
information from the child. This Note refocuses the lens of current reform 
efforts on the significance of children’s voices, stemming from both theory 
and practical necessity. It urges that reform efforts keep children, rather 
than lawyers, first in mind. Regardless of whether such a refocusing 
results in a client-directed or a best interests model as a resolution, it 
provides the appropriate analytical framework for reform efforts. 
However, through these considerations, along with a critique of the 
informal nature of actual dependency proceedings, this Note proposes that 
a client-directed attorney emerges as the option best suited to refocus 
reform efforts to consider children first.10  
Part I discusses child representation reform efforts over the last twelve 
years. It recounts the entrenched best interests status quo reflected across 
state statutes, the growing movement toward increasing client direction as 
manifested via prominent national conferences, and the mixed efforts of 
various model standards to shape lawyers’ roles. Part II discusses the 
discord between client-directed and best interests advocacy, as well as 
between the specific framework of existing standards and the growing 
movement toward client direction. It explains that the mismatch between 
this trend and the standards exists because the trend is child-focused 
whereas the standards are lawyer-focused. Part II next examines how 
current lawyer-focused standards curtail children’s participation and 
direction, why this curtailment is harmful, and what assumptions and 
biases underlie these standards. Part III identifies the informal nature of 
 
 
 9. See infra Part I.B. 
 10. This Note recognizes that some children are indisputably incapable of expressing wishes. 
Hence, this proposal does not encompass infants and other preverbal or nonverbal children. 












family court as a principal source of the general laxity in maintaining 
client direction in child advocacy, by way of its heavy deference to 
professional decision making in dependency cases. Specifically, Part III 
explains how the protective sentiment that pervades family court has 
helped sustain lawyer-focused models and the predominance of best 
interests advocacy. Part IV proposes that, in light of these circumstances 
and the need to refocus on children, children’s lawyers should assume 
roles as client-directed attorneys. Part IV also provides justifications as to 
how such a proposal would maximize client-directed advocacy without 
sacrificing the rehabilitative nature of family court. 
I. STANDARDS AND CONFERENCES: RECENT EFFORTS TO CLARIFY THE 
ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY 
The last several decades have witnessed a surge in discourse regarding 
the contentious issue of child representation. As no federal law articulates 
what the precise role of a child’s attorney should be, each state has 
adopted its own laws to guide its lawyers.11 Despite the overarching status 
quo in maintaining best interests advocacy as a preferred option, this state-
by-state development has generated considerable inconsistency among the 
state statutes,12 and has thereby triggered a desire for reform. 
A. National Conferences Establish a Growing Consensus  
Two national conferences, one at Fordham University13 (Fordham or 
Fordham Conference) and the other at the University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas14 (UNLV or UNLV Conference), culminated much of the scholarly 
debate surrounding child representation. Together, these conferences 
book-ended a decade of movement toward a client-directed model of child 
 
 
 11. See YALE LAW SCHOOL, REPRESENTING CHILDREN WORLDWIDE: HOW CHILDREN’S VOICES 
ARE HEARD IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS (2005), http://www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/ 
summary.htm [hereinafter REPRESENTING CHILDREN WORLDWIDE] (summarizing current child 
representation legislation across the world, including each state in the United States).  
 12. See Merril Sobie, The Child Client: Representing Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 
22 TOURO L. REV. 745, 754–56 (2006) (describing the variety of state statutes governing child 
representation in dependency proceedings). See also REPRESENTING CHILDREN WORLDWIDE, supra 
note 11.  
 13. Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of 
Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (1996) [hereinafter Fordham Conference]. 
 14. Recommendations of the UNLV Conference on Representing Children in Families: Child 














advocacy.15 Although state statutes collectively indicate a national 
preference for best interests advocacy, Fordham and UNLV represent a 
gradual movement away from this preference. The conferences have 
produced not only academic discourse, but also practice guides addressing 
how to effect the desired changes.16 
The consensus at Fordham is captured in the first line of its 
recommendations: “A lawyer appointed or retained to serve a child in a 
legal proceeding should serve as the child’s lawyer.”17 With regard to the 
existing variety of legal and non-legal child advocacy, Fordham first states 
that “[l]aws currently authorizing the appointment of a lawyer to serve in a 
legal proceeding as a child’s guardian ad litem should be amended to 
authorize instead the appointment of a lawyer to represent the child in the 
proceeding.”18 Addressing the diversity within the role of children’s 
lawyers, Fordham’s second recommendation states that “[l]aws that 
require lawyers serving on behalf of children to assume responsibilities 
inconsistent with those of a lawyer for the child as the client should be 
eliminated.”19 With this objective as a unifying theme, Fordham then 
provides guidance for lawyers representing children of varying 
capacities.20 Fordham’s guidance regarding interviewing, counseling, and 
confidentiality speaks collectively to children of all capacities.21  
Ten years later, “[a]ffirming and building upon”22 the Fordham 
recommendations, the UNLV Conference produced a practice guide “to 
assist attorneys to maximize the child’s participation in proceedings 
involving the child’s interests through deeply grounded representation.”23 
The UNLV recommendations specifically state that “[c]hildren’s attorneys 
should take their direction from the client and should not substitute for the 
 
 
 15. Ann M. Haralambie, Humility and Child Autonomy in Child Welfare and Custody 
Representation of Children, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 177, 179 (2006) (“The profession has 
moved towards giving the child greater autonomy in directing legal representation to allow the child’s 
own position and perspective to be given real advocacy. . . .”). 
 16. Annette R. Appell, Children’s Voice and Justice: Lawyering for Children in the Twenty-First 
Century, 6 NEV. L.J. 692, 714–19 (2006) (outlining guidelines to discerning children’s voices); ANN 
M. HARALAMBIE, THE CHILD’S ATTORNEY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CUSTODY, 
ADOPTION, AND PROTECTION CASES (1993); JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD 
PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS (2007) (a practice guide seeking 
to enhance child representation). 
 17. Fordham Conference, supra note 13, at 1301. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1302. 
 20. Id. at 1308–14.  
 21. Id. at 1302–09. 
 22. UNLV Conference, supra note 14, at 592. 
 23. Id. at 593. 












child’s wishes the attorney’s own judgment of what is best for children or 
for that child.”24 These recommendations urge lawyers to gain a holistic 
sense of their clients’ lives, families, and communities,25 as well as 
multidisciplinary training and assistance in cases.26 They further provide 
guidance on how to maximize children’s participation in the 
representation.27 Specifically, the recommendations outline limited 
circumstances28 in which lawyers should substitute judgment for their 
clients, namely when the child “lacks the capacity to make adequately 
considered decisions[,]” when “the child’s expressed preferences would be 
seriously injurious[,]” or when the attorney is practicing “in a jurisdiction 
that requires the attorney to exercise substituted judgment or act as a 
guardian ad litem.”29 In reaffirming Fordham’s recommendations for legal 
reform, the UNLV recommendations propose that the “[m]eans of 
achieving this goal include curbing judicial or legislative discretion to 
dictate . . . the child’s attorney’s role and interpreting or modifying the 
[federal] Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (“CAPTA”) mandate 
for appointment of best interests representatives for children to include the 
appointment of a client-directed attorney.”30 
Though Fordham and UNLV represent only one school of thought in 
the child advocacy debate,31 they are products of experts across the 
country,32 and therefore they symbolize a significant consensus favoring 
client-directed child representation in dependency proceedings.  
 
 
 24. Id. at 609.  
 25. Id. at 593–95. 
 26. Id. at 598–605. 
 27. Id. at 595–96. 
 28. As Jane Spinak explained, under the UNLV recommendations, “[e]ven the lawyer 
representing a client unable to direct representation at all or in part, substitutes judgment on behalf of 
the child only after taking significant steps to determine what position the client would want the 
attorney to take.” Jane M. Spinak, Simon Says Take Three Steps Backwards: The National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Recommendations on Child Representation, 6 NEV. L.J. 
1385, 1387 (2006). 
 29. UNLV Conference, supra note 14, at 609. The UNLV recommendations admonish lawyers, 
however, of the limits of relying on capacity as a reason to substitute judgment.  
When assessing the child’s capacity to make a decision, the following apply: (A) Capacity to 
communicate does not include failure to communicate; (B) Generally, the only children who 
cannot communicate are those who are pre-verbal or otherwise unable to communicate their 
objectives; (C) When the child’s preferences would be “seriously injurious” does not mean 
merely contrary to the lawyer’s opinion of what would be in [the] child’s interests. 
Id. 
 30. Id. at 611 (footnote omitted). 
 31. Other scholars, who are in favor of best-interests representation, disagree with Fordham’s 
stance. For examples of arguments supporting the best interests approach, see infra note 68. 
 32. Seventy of the nation’s child advocacy scholars attended the Fordham Conference. Fordham 













B. Conflicts Among Various State and National Standards 
Outside of this reform effort, state laws and national model standards 
for child representation remain inconsistent. Only a handful of state 
statutes have default positions which allow children to direct their 
lawyer’s advocacy.33 The remaining states allow for either client-directed 
attorneys or the alternative best interests attorneys depending on factors 
such as the judge’s or representative’s discretion or the child’s age and 
capacity.34 Such discretionary lines have resulted in inconsistent placement 
of similar children into both types of representation,35 as well as unclear 
roles for children’s lawyers. In an attempt to promote consistency and 
clarity, several national organizations have drafted model standards.  
The American Bar Association published its Standards of Practice for 
Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases (ABA 
Standards or ABA Abuse and Neglect Standards) in 1996.36 The ABA 
Standards treat child clients the same as they would adult clients. These 
Standards acknowledge that children develop in increments and may be 
able to voice opinions on some issues, even if not all issues, at any given 
age.37 Hence, they require children’s lawyers to be zealous advocates of 
their clients’ wishes instead of best interests advocates or presenters of 
 
 
Representation of Children, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/st-2eilr.ihtml?id=685 (last visited Sept. 22, 
2008). The Fordham Law Review published a special edition dedicated to the Conference, consisting 
of collaborative recommendations and working group reports, along with twenty-four articles written 
by twenty-six of the Conference’s participants. For a list of articles and authors in the table of contents, 
see Contents, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. at ix, ix (1996). 
 For a list of the ninety-five participants at the UNLV Conference, see Participants in the 
Conference on Representing Children in Families: Children’s Advocacy & Justice Ten Years After 
Fordham, http://rcif.law.unlv.edu/participants (follow “Representing Children in Families 
Participants.pdf” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).  
 33. See REPRESENTING CHILDREN WORLDWIDE, supra note 11. Louisiana, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, Oklahoma, and West Virginia reasonably reflect policies parallel to those expressed at 
Fordham and UNLV, as they provide children with client-directed lawyers at the outset of the 
proceeding. Id. 
 34. See id. Lawyers in states such as Arizona, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, 
Tennessee, and West Virginia, fulfill a hybrid role of advocating the child’s best interests along with 
the child’s wishes. Id. Still other states, such as Minnesota, New Mexico, and Wisconsin provide 
client-directed lawyers, but only for children who reach a certain age. Id. The balance of the states 
present varied schemes, often relying on the court’s discretion, the appointed representative’s 
discretion, or the development of a conflict between the client’s wishes and the representative’s 
assessment of the child’s best interests. Id. 
 35. The UNLV Conference responded to this problem by suggesting that legislatures and judges 
should be limited in how they can define lawyers’ roles. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
 36. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT 
CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES (1996), available at http://www.abanet.org/family/reports/ 
standards_abuseneglect.pdf.  
 37. Id. § B-4(1). 












neutral evidence. Additionally, they directly incorporate the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct38 to determine whether a child client is “under a 
disability.”39 Proponents of client-directed child advocacy appreciate the 
ABA Standards because they “instruct[] lawyers to err on the side of 
empowering children.”40 However, the Standards have also been criticized 
by those who suspect that lawyers may try to exert power over a child 
client who may frequently qualify as having severely diminished 
capacity.41 Furthermore, some critics argue that the Model Rules, which 
broadly offer guidance for representing a “[c]lient with diminished 
capacity,”42 are inadequate to address the unique issues that affect child 
clients.43 
Five years after the introduction of the ABA Standards, the National 
Association of Counsel for Children (NACC) established a modified 
version of the ABA Standards called the NACC Recommendations for 
Representation of Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases (NACC 
Standards).44 The NACC clearly recommends that all children receive 
 
 
 38. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2002). 
 39. Id.  
 40. Martin Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need for Counsel for Children in Custody, Visitation 
and Child Protection Proceedings, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 299, 321 (1998). Guggenheim comments on 
how the ABA Standards embrace Fordham’s view that client wishes should control whenever possible. 
“It is important to underscore that this uniformity is achieved by instructing lawyers to err on the side 
of empowering children. The ABA Standards explicitly direct lawyers to advocate the position 
articulated by the client ‘[i]n all but the exceptional cases, such as with a preverbal child[.]’” Id.  
 41. As an initial matter, the ABA Standards, “which present the closest thing to a uniform model 
of representation for lawyers representing children, are simply recommendations and have no binding 
effect.” Theresa Hughes, A Paradigm of Youth Client Satisfaction: Heightening Professional 
Responsibility for Children’s Advocates, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 551, 574 (2007). 
“Compounding the problem is the issue of lack of resolve: if a young person is unsatisfied with the 
representation, he or she is unlikely to seek redress.” Id. at 578.  
 Additionally, some concern has been expressed because the ABA Standards only recommend, but 
do not require, lawyers to serve solely as lawyers. The ABA’s stance in this respect has raised both 
questions and concerns. “When the Abuse & Neglect Standards left open the door for attorneys to 
continue to function in the dual role of counsel for the child and guardian ad litem, they disregarded 
the inherent conflicts created by the attorney's obligation to comply with the state ethics code.” David 
R. Katner, Coming to Praise, Not to Bury, the New ABA Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who 
Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 124 (2000). 
 42. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2002).  
 43. See Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1401 (1996) (“The Model Rules of Professional Conduct unhelpfully instruct 
lawyers representing young children ‘as far as reasonably possible, [to] maintain a normal client-
lawyer relationship with the client.’ . . . [However,] the Rules are unhelpful in clarifying where and 
how the relationships are to differ.”) (footnote omitted). 
 But see Appell, supra note 16; HARALAMBIE, supra note 16; PETERS, supra note 16. Each of these 
three practice guides supplements the Model Rules by specifically addressing children and instructing 
lawyers how to foster an appropriate relationship with child clients. 













legal representatives instead of non-lawyers, who are otherwise available 
as guardians ad litem.45 However, “[r]ather than urging jurisdictions to 
choose a particular model, [the NACC Standards] set[] out a checklist of 
children’s needs that should be met by whatever representation scheme is 
chosen.”46 In setting up its standards in this fashion, the NACC hoped to 
“avoid becoming mired in the debate over best interests and expressed 
wishes.”47 The NACC endorsed most of what the ABA Standards set forth 
but revised them to lean more heavily towards a best interests approach, 
focusing on lawyers counseling their child clients but ultimately 
substituting their judgment for that of the client.48  
Most recently, in February 2007, the ABA endorsed49 the Uniform 
Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody Proceedings 
Act (NCCUSL Act or Act).50 The NCCUSL Act was drafted in 2006 by 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL). The NCCUSL Act explicitly integrates the ABA Abuse and 
Neglect Standards,51 as well as another set of ABA Standards for custody 
proceedings.52 The Prefatory Note to the Act also addresses the other 
major prior standards and conferences.53 Assuming the NCCUSL drafters 
considered all of the history discussed in the Act’s Prefatory Note, and in 
 
 
CASES (Nat’l Ass’n of Counsel for Children 2001), available at http://www.naccchildlaw.org/ 
resource/resmgr/docs/nacc_standards_and_recommend.pdf).  
 45. Id. at 5. 
 46. Id. at 4.  
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at 14–15. 
 49. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, www.abanet.org/leadership/ 
2007/midyear/docs/journal/hundredfivef.doc [hereinafter ABA ENDORSEMENT OF NCCUSL ACT] 
(“RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association approves the Uniform Representation of Children 
in Abuse, Neglect and Custody Proceedings Act, promulgated by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 2006 as an appropriate Act for those states desiring to adopt 
the specific substantive law suggested therein.”). 
 50. UNIF. REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS 
ACT (2006), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/RARCCDA/2006_finalact.pdf 
[hereinafter NCCUSL ACT]. 
 51. See supra text accompanying notes 36–37. 
 52. The ABA promulgated a separate set of child representation standards for the context of 
custody proceedings. See American Bar Association Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing 
Children in Custody Cases, 37 FAM. L.Q. 131 (2003). The Prefatory Note to the NCCUSL Act 
summarizes these ABA standards: “The ABA Custody Standards identify two distinct roles for 
attorneys who represent children: the ‘child’s attorney,’ who is in a traditional attorney-client 
relationship, and the ‘best interests attorney,’ who advocates a position that the attorney determines to 
be in the child’s best interests.” NCCUSL ACT, supra note 50, at 3–4. “The ABA Custody Standards 
explicitly reject the hybrid attorney/guardian ad litem model because of the confusion and ethical 
tensions inherent in the blended professional roles.” Id. at 4. 
 53.  NCCUSL ACT, supra note 50, at 4–5. 












light of the ABA’s recent endorsement54 of the Act, the NCCUSL Act 
embodies many of the current thoughts regarding how to legislate for child 
representation in dependency proceedings.  
The Prefatory Note to the NCCUSL Act specifies that “[t]he Act seeks 
to improve the representation of children in proceedings directly affecting 
their custody by clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of children’s 
representatives and by providing guidelines to courts in appointing 
representatives.”55 The Act sets up two categories of lawyers: child’s 
attorneys56 and best interests attorneys.57 The child’s attorney is to treat the 
child as an adult client and hence to allow the child to direct his or her 
representation.58 In contrast, the best interests attorney is not bound by the 
client’s wishes.59 The best interests attorney advocates for what the 
attorney believes is in the child’s best interest, after reviewing objective 
evidence.60 The NCCUSL Act requires the judge to determine at the outset 
of the proceeding whether to appoint a child’s attorney or a best interests 
attorney.61 This decision rests on factors such as the child’s age, 
developmental level, and expressed desires for an attorney or a specific 
outcome.62 The judge also has the option of appointing a third type of 
representative, the court-appointed advisor, who acts simply as an aid to 
the court in making a best interests determination.63  
 
 
 54. See ABA ENDORSEMENT OF NCCUSL ACT, supra note 49.  
 55. NCCUSL ACT, supra note 50, at 5. 
 56. “The child’s attorney is in a traditional attorney-client relationship with the child and is 
therefore bound by ordinary ethical obligations governing that relationship.” Id. at 6. The Act specifies 
that the child’s attorney should be a client-directed representative rather than a best interests 
representative. Id. The Act does allow for “a limited exercise of substituted judgment . . . when the 
child is incapable of directing or refuses to direct representation as to a particular issue. . . .” Id. at 6–7. 
In such a situation, the lawyer is authorized to make a decision for the child, so long as that decision 
does not conflict with the wishes the child did express. Id. at 7.  
 57. Id. at 7 (“The best interests attorney . . . is a legal representative of the child but is not bound 
by the child’s expressed wishes in determining what to advocate. Instead, the best interests attorney 
has the substantive responsibility of advocating for the child’s best interests based on an objective 
assessment of the available evidence and according to applicable legal principles.”). 
 58. Id. at 6. 
 59. Id. at 7. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 16 (“In an abuse or neglect proceeding, the court shall appoint either a child’s attorney 
or a best interests attorney. The appointment must be made as soon as practicable to ensure adequate 
representation of the child and, in any event, before the first court hearing that may substantially affect 
the interests of the child.”). 
 62. Id. (“In determining whether to appoint a child’s attorney or a best interests attorney, the 
court may consider such factors as the child’s age and developmental level, any desire for an attorney 
expressed by the child, whether the child has expressed objectives in the proceeding, and the value of 
an independent advocate for the child’s best interests.”).  
 63. Id. at 8 (“The role of the court-appointed advisor is to assist the court in determining the 













The NCCUSL Act is useful for analyzing the current state of child 
representation legislation, as it consolidates many of the mainstream ideas 
into one model. Along with integrating other accepted approaches to child 
representation, the Act incidentally sweeps in their accompanying 
drawbacks. It already has received criticism for its separation of roles and 
its methods of appointment.64 Generally, the Act implicitly endorses both 
the separation of attorney roles and best interests representation. Also 
implicit in this endorsement are the assumptions and implications of such 
rationales. 
II. THE MISMATCH BETWEEN THE CLIENT-DIRECTED TREND AND 
EXISTING STANDARDS 
Given its atypical client characteristics, sensitive subject matter, and 
multidisciplinary dimensions, child advocacy often appears amorphous. 
The efforts to clarify the goals of child advocacy in dependency 
proceedings have indeed been arduous. Decades of discourse, both 
consistent and at odds with the Fordham and UNLV recommendations,65 
indicate a consensus that the presence of some kind of child advocate is 
vital to the dependency proceeding. Underlying this agreement are the 
beliefs that some kind of child participation is valuable66 and that justice 
requires children to have some sort of advocate.67 This broad accord and 
its underlying premises might suggest a rather straightforward conclusion 
that reform efforts ought to enhance and expand child representation. 
 
 
and, where appropriate, making a recommendation to the court. . . . [T]he court-appointed advisor may 
not perform acts that would be restricted to a licensed attorney, even if the person functioning as a 
court-appointed advisor holds a license to practice law.”). 
 64. See generally Spinak, supra note 28. Professor Spinak criticizes the NCCUSL Act directly, 
from three principal perspectives. First, Spinak explains how the Act actually makes the attorney role 
more complicated, as it deviates from the steady national trend toward having lawyers act as lawyers 
in a single role, regardless of the client’s age. Id. at 1389. She argues that the division of roles set up 
by the NCCUSL Act is out of line with existing consensus, and that it pushes lawyers to act more for 
the state than for their own clients. Id. Next, Spinak explains how the power of the courts to appoint a 
“type” of attorney at the outset of the proceedings “undermines the independence of a lawyer.” Id. at 
1390. 
 65. See generally Fordham Conference, supra note 13; UNLV Conference, supra note 14. The 
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act also demonstrates how federal law embraces the idea that 
children should have some sort of representation in court, albeit guardian ad litem representation. See 
42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii) (2000). 
 66. See Ann M. Haralambie, Recognizing the Expertise of Children and Families, 6 NEV. L.J. 
1277 (2006) (describing the expert knowledge children and families have about their own lives).  
 67. As explained in an early New York case, “[w]ithout [legal] representation [for children], the 
natural parent vigorously focuses on parental rights and claims. The approach centers on whether ‘this 
child belongs to me,’ without an equal inquiry, on behalf of the unrepresented infant on whether ‘this 
parent belongs to me’.” In re Tyease J., 373 N.Y.S.2d 447, 450 (N.Y. Sur. 1975).  












However, despite the general agreement on this basic conclusion, the 
implications associated with effectuating it generate the divergence 
between general rhetoric and practical application of child representation 
standards. 
A. The Persisting Debate: Best Interests Versus Client-Directed Lawyers 
Most prevalent, particularly in modern scholarship and reform efforts, 
is the discord regarding how the child should participate in the proceeding. 
The two mainstream avenues of thought regarding this conflict over the 
nature of the lawyer-client relationship are commonly labeled “best 
interests” and “client-directed.” Each avenue has received praise,68 and 
each has received criticism.69 A notable distinction between the two is the 
 
 
 68. For arguments supporting the best interests approach, see Robert F. Harris, A Response to the 
Recommendations of the UNLV Conference: Another Look at the Attorney/Guardian Ad Litem Model, 
6 NEV. L.J. 1284, 1289–92 (2006); see also Frances Gall Hill, Clinical Education and the “Best 
Interest” Representation of Children in Custody Disputes: Challenges and Opportunities in Lawyering 
Pedagogy, 73 IND. L.J. 605, 623–24 (1998). Though Hill addresses custody proceedings, the analysis 
of best interests representation is the same in either context.  
Best-interest representation is consistent with society’s notion that children have not attained 
the full measure of cognitive skills, maturity, and judgment necessary for autonomous 
decisionmaking. . . . [Guardian ad litem] representation allows the child to fully express his 
needs, concerns, and desires, but screens the child’s position for accuracy and investigates the 
child's situation from the broader perspective of the family system and the long-range 
interests of the child. 
Id. at 623 (footnote omitted). These supporters also consider as beneficial and appropriate best 
interests attorneys’ ability to incorporate societal values into their investigation and advocacy. Id. at 
623–24. Such normative considerations are seen to generate the best options for all children. Id. For 
arguments supporting the client-directed approach, see generally Elrod, supra note 6. 
 69. For criticism of the best interests standard, see Sobie, supra note 12, at 807–08.  
First, the “best interests” of the child is largely irrelevant unless and until parental 
malfeasance has been proven . . . . Similarly, concluding in a termination of parental rights 
case that the child should be adopted is meaningless, unless and until the court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that sufficient facts exist to permit termination. 
Id. at 807 (footnote omitted). The best interests role for attorneys is also criticized because the court’s 
overall disposition must accord with the child’s best interests; hence, best interests advocacy for 
lawyers is arguably repetitive. Id. at 808; see also Shari Shink, Justice for Our Children: Justice for a 
Change, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 629, 646–47 (2005) (explaining the type of racial and class-based 
discretion that biases best interests determinations, as well as the general ambiguity surrounding these 
determinations). 
 For criticism of client-directed models, see Donald N. Duquette, Legal Representation for 
Children in Protection Proceedings: Two Distinct Lawyer Roles are Required, 34 FAM. L.Q. 441, 444, 
448–49 (2000).  
[T]hese so-called client-directed models actually contain within themselves serious 
opportunities for lawyers to exercise unfettered and unreviewed discretion in representing 
children. This discretion is even more serious than that complained about under the pure best 
interests approach because the latitude permitted in the client-directed models is more private 













way in which each standard seeks to incorporate the child in the 
proceeding. Models adopting a best interests approach endorse the 
arrangement by which a third party steps into the child’s position, collects 
information from the child and the child’s surroundings, and then arrives 
at the third party’s own conclusions as to what is best for the child.70 In 
contrast, models adopting a client-directed approach perceive actual child 
direction in the proceeding as the requisite standard for child 
participation.71 Proponents of best interests advocacy focus primarily on 
children’s general lack of capacity to make reasoned decisions as adults 
can. Hence, they rest their stance on children’s apparent inability to 
adequately direct their lawyers.72 Proponents of client-directed advocacy 
present a different view of capacity,73 strive to empower children,74 and 
 
 
Id. at 444. Critics of the client-directed approach also highlight how children in dependency 
proceedings are frequently traumatized and under pressure from both parents to make certain 
decisions. Id. at 448. Another common criticism concerns how the client-directed model does not 
accommodate for preverbal or pre-capacity children. Id. at 448. But see supra note 10. 
 70.  NCCUSL ACT, supra note 50, at 7.  
 71. Id. at 6–7.  
 72. See Harris, supra note 68, at 1285.  
 73. See Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Empowerment of Child Clients, 
84 CORNELL L. REV. 895, 905 (1999). “[W]hen the issue is not who should have the authority to 
determine the ultimate outcome, but who should have an opportunity to attempt to influence the 
ultimate decision maker (here, the court), reasoning ability should matter much less.” Id. Another 
related argument compares the relationship between lawyer and child in dependency proceedings to 
that in delinquency proceedings. See Martin Guggenheim, The Right to Be Represented but Not 
Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 90–92 (1984). This 
argument reasons that the relative ages at which children in delinquency proceedings and children in 
dependency proceedings are allowed to direct their lawyers should correspond. Id. at 90. First, this 
argument is premised on the common goals of both delinquency and dependency proceedings: to help 
children. Id. at 91. Moreover, both types of proceedings can lead to similar results, in that children in 
both proceedings may be removed from their parents’ homes. Id. “[T]he child’s power to direct his 
counsel and thereby make his own views and preferences known to the judge and jury should not turn 
on fortuities such as whether the state has decided to proceed by way of a delinquency proceeding 
rather than . . . a protective proceeding.” Id. at 92. 
 74. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Perspective on the Rights of 
Children, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1585 (1995) (“Under present accounts, capacity is a prerequisite to having 
and exercising rights. . . . [M]oving our rights talk beyond notions of the capacity of the rights holder 
. . . [and] thinking about the powerlessness of children helps us to construct new images of childhood 
that are not tied to disabling accounts of children’s helplessness and vulnerability”). Id. at 1585–86 
(footnote omitted). For more on Federle’s empowerment theory, see Katherine Hunt Federle, The 
Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child 
Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655 (1996). 
 Buss offers another empowerment-oriented approach. See Buss, supra note 73, at 961. Buss rests 
much of her analysis on how children’s diminished capacity limits empowerment goals. Id. at 927–47. 
However, although admittedly casting doubt on the client-directed attorney model, Buss ultimately 
rejects the guardian ad litem model, arguing that “modifying [the client-directed attorney] model to 
address its inadequacies would serve children better than abandoning the approach in favor of the 
guardian ad litem, or best interest, approach.” Id. at 950.  












view children as experts75 on their own family lives.  
The incongruity in what is considered appropriate in either of these two 
camps is a key contributor to the frequent discrepancy between any 
expressed goals of child advocacy and their selected means. The patent 
contrast between the standards adopting either of these views may seem 
remarkable, especially considering the common goal of enhancing child 
representation. However, each group of thought believes its method 
achieves the goal, chiefly because each group believes it accommodates 
for the maximum feasible child participation. For instance, those who 
focus on children’s limited capacity consider the child’s contribution to 
the lawyer’s best interests determination as sufficient in relation to the 
child’s decision-making capabilities.76 Notably, these two views differ not 
only in how they incorporate the child, but also in how they are 
configured. Best interests models, by assigning to lawyers full decision-
making authority, are framed around the lawyer’s role itself. In contrast, 
client-directed models keep the child at the center of their framework, and 
have the lawyer react to that position.  
Even aside from the intricacies of these two views, the simple existence 
of such a dichotomy evokes an overlooked set of principles underlying the 
recent dialogue surrounding child representation reforms. While this 
dichotomy is generally considered the baseline for child advocacy models 
and reforms, peering beneath its surface reveals important assumptions. 
These assumptions suggest that perhaps a broader debate is the source of 
the mismatch between the consensus favoring child direction and the 
efforts to legislate. 
B. The Overlooked Yet Underlying Discrepancy: Lawyer-Centered Versus 
Child-Centered Models  
Examining the broader implications of what various reformers seek to 
achieve elucidates an even more fundamental discrepancy in the child 
representation debate. While recent discourse in academics, practice 
guides, and reform efforts tends to concentrate on how to promote client 
 
 
 75. See generally Haralambie, supra note 66. Though this article does not argue for either best 
interests or client-directed advocacy per se, it explores the value of the type of information that 
children are able to provide. “Children . . . alone know what relationships matter to them. . . . They can 
often provide valuable information on family interactions and other family resources. If we really 
listen to them, we may be surprised at the insights they have about what does and does not work in 
their families.” Id. at 1282. 













participation, the immediate goal of state laws77 and many national 
standards has been to clarify the role of the child’s attorney as a means of 
better representing children. While seemingly subtle, the discrepancy 
between the focus of the discourse and the focus of the laws and standards 
highlights how different theories of improving child representation can 
have profoundly different practical effects as a result of their incongruous 
goals.  
Reform efforts should balance child advocates’ need for clarity with 
the unique concerns arising in the child advocacy field at large. A lawyer’s 
clarity of purpose is undoubtedly essential to competent representation, 
but it should be addressed in its appropriate context. Indeed, unless 
lawyers have a clear idea of what actions are required, prohibited, and 
discretionary, they will be unable to represent their clients with sufficient 
zeal, for they may be unaware of the limits or appropriateness of their 
actions. Beyond these basic principles, however, the context of child 
advocacy in dependency proceedings—which is still relatively new in 
legal practice78—requires additional considerations. These considerations 
encompass the reasons for having child representation at all,79 the goals 
accompanying those reasons,80 and the recognition that children’s rights 
are still developing.81 Moreover, as modern studies continue to indicate 
that children have not only strong opinions but also a critical 
understanding of their family lives,82 the need to hone in on children’s 
thoughts and desires is critical to truly effective representation. Though 
mainstream thoughts still diverge on how best to accomplish this honing,83 
the logic of focusing heavily on children’s needs applies regardless. 
 
 
 77. See REPRESENTING CHILDREN WORLDWIDE, supra note 11; see also supra notes 33–34.  
 78. New York became the first state to provide lawyers for children in 1962. Sobie, supra note 
12, at 752. 
 79. See In re Tyease J., 373 N.Y.S.2d 447, 450 (N.Y. Sur. 1975); see also Elrod, supra note 6, at 
899–904. 
 80. Regardless of the type of model, the goals of child advocacy reform are to enhance child 
representation. Hence, in any event, the logical stance is to begin by considering the child and then to 
draft a representational scheme from that point.  
 81. See David D. Meyer, The Modest Promise of Children’s Relationship Rights, 11 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1117 (2003) (discussing how, in the context of family relations, while parents’ 
rights have been well established, children’s rights remain murky). See also Elrod, supra note 6, at 877 
(“Why is it so difficult to recognize the individual personhood of children? Today, 192 of 194 nations 
recognize the individual personhood of children by incorporating the rights stated in the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. . . . What is flawed is that more states and the United States do 
not have similar documents . . . . Instead, children rely on piecemeal federal and state legislation 
granting benefits in areas such as welfare and education. . . .”). 
 82. See generally Haralambie, supra note 66. 
 83. See supra Part II.A.  












This backdrop strongly suggests that the focus of reform efforts 
surrounding child representation should first be on the child’s role as an 
independent party and secondarily on clarifying the lawyer’s function to 
accommodate for that role. As children have been recognized as requiring 
separate representation, their status as an official third party to the 
proceeding must be honored; hence, how each child may fully partake in 
the proceeding deserves primary attention. However, the existing 
emphasis on first delineating the role of the lawyer by separating it into 
mutually exclusive categories—best interests and client-directed—has 
resulted in a collectively lawyer-focused reform effort. This structure has 
sustained the separation of best interests and client-directed representation; 
in turn, this separation has come at the expense of silencing many 
children’s voices. Even in states where all child advocates are best 
interests representatives,84 though the statutes do not require selecting 
between categories of lawyer roles, they embrace a default position that 
provides disproportionately more deference to the lawyer than to the 
child.85 Ironically, then, a movement to promote child representation has 
shifted its lens from focusing on the child to focusing on the lawyer. 
A major consequence of such a shift is manifested in the criticism of 
the 1995 American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers Standards for 
Attorneys and Guardians Ad Litem in Custody or Visitation Proceedings 
(AAML Standards).86 These standards, addressing child representation in 
custody and visitation proceedings, categorize children as either 
“impaired” or “unimpaired.”87 The former group receives lawyers who 
serve primarily as information-gatherers, whereas the latter group receives 
client-directed lawyers to advocate for the clients’ wishes.88 The principle 
criticism of such an “all-or-nothing”89 scheme is that “th[is] categorization 
 
 
 84. For example, states such as Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Washington, and Wyoming require only best interests representatives, with no provision requiring the 
representative to express the child’s view to the court. See REPRESENTING CHILDREN WORLDWIDE, 
supra note 11; see also supra notes 33–34. 
 85. See supra Part II.A. 
 86. Am. Acad. of Matrimonial Lawyers, Representing Children: Standards for Attorneys and 
Guardians ad Litem in Custody or Visitation Proceedings (With Commentary), 13 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 1 (1995). 
 87. Id. at 8–27. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Ann M. Haralambie & Deborah L. Glaser, Practical and Theoretical Problems with the 
AAML Standards for Representing “Impaired” Children, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 57, 67 
(1995).  
What does the attorney do if the child comprehends some of the issues in the case but not 













of children is impractical in application and . . . the diminished role of 
attorneys for ‘impaired’ children, precluding such attorneys from 
advocating a position, deprives the children, the court, and the other 
parties of the creative, child-oriented advocacy which is the hallmark of a 
trained child’s attorney.”90 Such criticism rests on the premise that because 
impairment itself is not amenable to discrete categorization, children 
should not be categorized according to it.91 While such categorization 
arguably accomplishes the goal of delineating roles to guide lawyers,92 it 
operates prophylactically to withhold the power of some supposedly 
“impaired” children to direct their relationship with their attorneys, when 
they might actually have been able to direct their attorneys to a certain 
extent. If the goal is instead to enhance and optimize child participation, 
then standards should operate prophylactically in the other direction. Even 
setting aside the debate between best interests and client-directed 
advocacy, the primary focus on lawyers as opposed to individual children 
is misguided.  
C. Shortcomings, Biases, and Faulty Assumptions of the Lawyer-Centered 
Approach 
The lawyer-centered framework of mainstream models is largely 
responsible for the models’ shortcomings. Fulfilling client-centered goals, 
such as those expressed in Fordham and UNLV, requires the presumption 
that a child can direct his or her lawyer, until a reason exists to believe the 
contrary.93 Even without embracing the client direction philosophy, client-
 
 
. . . The [AAML] Standards require an all-or-nothing determination of impairment, but 
impairment itself is not an all-or-nothing condition. This is a fundamental empirical flaw in 
the Standards’ distinction between “impaired” and “unimpaired” children. 
Id. 
 90. Id. at 57. This article argues that the distinction between impaired and unimpaired is 
unworkable. It discusses child development, explains the value of even the supposedly irrational 
information children provide, notes the “perversion” of the attorney’s role when acting as mere fact-
finder, and criticizes the inflexibility of the all-or-nothing categorization between impaired and 
unimpaired. Id. at 66–70. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Simply categorizing children such that one group will direct its lawyer while another will 
receive best interests advocacy does not guarantee clarity for lawyers. Best interests lawyers still face a 
foggy set of responsibilities, often hinging on pure discretion. See Guggenheim, supra note 40, at 307.
Furthermore, this exercise of discretion may result in a tenuous decision. “[I]n spite of a [best 
interests] decision-maker’s best efforts, there remains a wide variety of circumstances that cannot be 
accounted for both in the present and in the future, which may distort the validity of the decision as 
being in the child’s best interests.” CLAIRE BREEN, THE STANDARD OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD: A WESTERN TRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 17 (2002).  
 93. See Fordham Conference, supra note 13, at 1312 (“As with adults, lawyers have an ethical 












centered goals place heavier weight on extracting maximum information 
from each child for each issue.94 However, most modern statutes and 
standards, such as the NCCUSL Act, provide that some threshold 
determination, generally based on age or capacity, will determine what 
type of advocacy—client-directed, best interests, or some combination of 
the two—the lawyer will provide.95 Lawyers are then prescribed a singular 
role to fulfill. Inherent in such a setup is the presupposition that certain 
children cannot—and therefore should not be allowed to—direct their 
lawyers at all. Those children for whom a best interests attorney is 
appointed gain no statutory right to have any of their opinions advocated 
to the court, as best-interests attorneys may make their recommendations 
irrespective of a child’s wishes.96 Hence, in models such as the NCCUSL 
Act, the judge’s threshold determination as to which “type” of lawyer a 
child will receive97 accomplishes the same effect as the AAML 
Standards,98 and thereby places disproportionate weight on categories of 
lawyering rather than on how to optimize child participation. 
This framework falls short by failing to account for the value of 
children’s direct input in dependency proceedings; furthermore, standards 
that are bifurcated into client-directed and best interests options allow for 
the potentially inappropriate assignment of a best interests lawyer and its 
ensuing dangers. The introduction to the UNLV recommendations 
highlights both the value of children’s input and the dangers of best 
interests advocacy.99 It notes that children have come to be valued as 
individuals with personal opinions, and that lawyers often fail to account 
for children’s cultural and community needs when they try to 
independently substitute their own judgment for that of the client.100 
 
 
obligation to advocate the position of a child unless there is independent evidence that the child is 
unable to express a reasoned choice. Where such evidence exists, a lawyer must engage in additional 
fact finding to determine whether the child has or may develop the capacity to direct the lawyer’s 
action.”).  
 94. See Appell, supra note 16; HARALAMBIE, supra note 16; PETERS, supra note 16.  
 95. See REPRESENTING CHILDREN WORLDWIDE, supra note 11; see also supra notes 33–34.  
 96. See supra note 84. Other states require best interests attorneys to report the child’s wishes to 
the court at all stages, and still others require such reporting when the lawyer’s opinion departs from 
the child’s. See REPRESENTING CHILDREN WORLDWIDE, supra note 11. Among those states are 
Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 
Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. In any event, even lawyers in these latter two categories may still make 
their own independent recommendations to the court regarding the child’s best interests. Id.; see also 
supra notes 33–34. 
 97. NCCUSL ACT, supra note 50, at 16. 
 98. See supra Part II.B. 
 99. See UNLV Conference, supra note 14, at 592. 













Because children are experts on their personal lives,101 their opinions 
ought to be given sufficient weight. Lawyer-centered models, however, 
provide for a double-layer filter for best interests analysis; rather than 
relying on the judge’s required best interests determination at the 
conclusion of the proceeding, models embracing the best interests 
advocacy option often filter the child’s voice through the lawyer’s best 
interests analysis and then again through the judge’s. Hence, these models 
leave considerable room for distortion, even if it is inadvertent. 
Moreover, the initial categorization of lawyers into the bifurcated 
scheme is fraught with personal perceptions and biases,102 no matter how 
well intentioned it might be.103 Emotions, subjective beliefs, and instincts 
often color the decision.104 Though each type of appointed attorney may be 
statutorily confined to fulfilling only certain duties in order to reduce the 
attorney’s inclination to advocate solely from his own ideals, such 
confinement may not be sufficient to overcome biases.105 Discretion still 
pervades through the decision regarding a child’s capacity and the 
application of the statutes.106 Judges or lawyers (depending on the 
 
 
 101. See Haralambie, supra note 66, at 1282.  
 102. See Amy Sinden, “Why Won’t Mom Cooperate?”: A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare 
Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 380 (1999). Sinden explains how the emotional nature of 
dependency proceedings often leads to distorted decisions based on instincts rather than proper 
deliberation. Id. Given these circumstances, Sinden argues that “[b]ecause of these pressures, the 
evidentiary constraints and protections against bias and prejudice afforded by formality are particularly 
important in the child welfare context.” Id. at 381. 
 103. UNLV Conference, supra note 14, at 592. 
[C]hildren’s attorneys can find themselves, and the legal and related social systems that serve 
or govern children, inattentive to the complexity and individuality of the children and families 
that come before them. The result is that these often well-meaning professionals and systems 
sometimes substitute their own interests or ideas about what children need for the wisdom of 
the children and their families, and provide solutions that are neither welcome nor responsive 
to the need.  
Id. 
 104. See Sinden, supra note 102, at 380; see also UNLV Conference, supra note 14, at 592 (“In 
these instances, professionals and systems fail to appreciate the strengths and expertise of children and 
families regarding what they want, what they need, and how they define the problem. Moreover, these 
failures fall disproportionately and most punitively on African American and Latino children and 
families.”). 
 105. See Randi Mandelbaum, Revisiting the Question of Whether Young Children in Child 
Protection Proceedings Should Be Represented by Lawyers, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 45–48 (2000). 
Mandelbaum argues that even if lawyers who are assigned to represent very young children (and who 
hence must serve as best-interests attorneys) are restricted to working toward only statutorily 
delineated goals for the child, the proceeding will still have been based on biased perceptions because 
of the child’s initial assignment of one type of lawyer or another. Id. at 45. Mandelbaum asserts that 
the initial determination of which children are impaired and unimpaired could have dramatic effects on 
the child’s representation throughout the proceeding, regardless of the lawyer’s attempts to maintain 
neutrality. Id. at 46–48. 
 106. “[M]uch discretion remains in the determination of when a child is impaired and the meaning 












particular statute) also retain substantial discretion in determining the 
category in which each child belongs; consequently, this decision may 
depend entirely on the specific perceptions of a particular decision 
maker.107 Furthermore, such decisions often rest on adults’ perceptions of 
children as a group, rather than the individual child at issue. Some scholars 
have cautioned against such a collective view of children by emphasizing 
children’s unique qualities and situations.108  
Finally, although many models are premised on the idea that 
classifying lawyers into best interests and client-directed groups will 
establish sufficient clarity regarding lawyers’ roles,109 and thus will 
enhance their ability to represent children, such a presupposition may not 
hold true.110 Because of the discretionary nature of best interests 
advocacy111 and the complexities of representing non- or semi-verbal 
children even in client-directed advocacy,112 lawyers in both groups may 
 
 
and implementation of statutory fidelities or statutory mandates.” Id. at 45. 
 107. See id. at 45–46. Mandelbaum directly addresses the issues surrounding lawyers who must 
determine how they shall represent their own child clients. However, this analysis naturally 
encompasses anyone who would be designated as the initial decision maker, including the judge in the 
NCCUSL Act. “[W]hat is important to highlight is that in making the determination of when a child is 
sufficiently mature, an extraordinary amount of discretion still remains with the legal representative. 
. . . [One] lawyer might find the [child] to be unimpaired, while an equally well-meaning attorney 
might reach the opposite conclusion.” Id. at 46. 
 108. Annette Appell has discussed how universal standards of child representation are difficult to 
achieve because of the vast diversity among children. Appell, supra note 16, at 712. However, Appell 
has also admonished that “[t]he answer is not . . . to throw our hands up at these challenges and 
substitute our own platonic professional opinions regarding justice for children.” Id. at 713. 
Furthermore, Appell cautions against the tendency to view children as “automaton[s]” rather than to 
directly account for children’s unique and diverse needs and experiences. Id. at 714. Many models 
emphasize the importance of gathering specific information about each child and his or her 
circumstances, even when the child is too young to verbally offer the information to his or her 
attorneys. See also Mandelbaum, supra note 105, at 67–69. 
 109. For justifications for a dual model, see generally Donald N. Duquette, Two Distinct 
Roles/Bright Line Test, 6 NEV. L.J. 1240 (2006) (explaining that both the client-directed model and 
best-interests model are inadequate to accommodate for all children and that each model is appropriate 
for a distinct set of children); Duquette, supra note 69, at 441 (“[I]t is a mistake to try to develop a 
single lawyer role for children in protection cases which tries to accommodate their developing 
capacities from infants to articulate teens. . . . [W]e should resolve the ambivalence not by adopting a 
client-directed or a best interests approach, but by having two sets of standards—one for the client-
directed attorney role and one for a best interests guardian ad litem. . . .”). 
 110. For a discussion of the lack of clarity associated with classifying lawyers as best interests 
advocates, see supra note 92; see also Guggenheim, supra note 40, at 307. Regarding the NCCUSL 
Act’s separation of roles, Professor Spinak has commented that “[d]espite the drafters’ assertions, 
creating another role perpetuates the confusion about how to represent children and stymies the 
extraordinary efforts to refine the role of the child’s lawyer through the multi-disciplinary research and 
practice that has flourished in the last decade.” Spinak, supra note 28, at 1389. 
 111. See Mandelbaum, supra note 105, at 45–48. 
 112. Professor Guggenheim has argued that difficulties in representing children under a client-













still be unclear as to how to represent their clients.113 Inconsistency also 
persists among best interests lawyers as to how each lawyer determines 
what is in the child’s best interest.114 Hence, this underlying assumption 
that bifurcation of attorney roles will achieve clarity is subject to 
shortcomings that may undermine the classification’s purposes. 
III. PINPOINTING A SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM: INFORMALITY OF THE 
FAMILY COURT  
A. The Roots of Informality and the Ensuing Emphasis on Best Interests 
Advocacy 
In addition to considering preferences for best interests and client-
directed models and the practical implications of representing children, 
scholars have examined the history of child representation as a source of 
understanding the reasons for the current, unsettled state of child 
advocacy. A major source of confusion often discussed is the 
counterintuitive development of child representation at its early stages. 
The child representation movement first witnessed significant expansion 
of the designated contexts and proceedings requiring child representation, 
and it thereafter shifted to defining the role of the lawyer.115 This historical 
perspective sheds light on why children’s attorneys have struggled to 
achieve uniformity in representation. However, it does not capture why the 
focus has been permitted to rest so heavily on the role of the lawyer 
instead of on the participation of the child. Instead, considering the 
 
 
note 43, at 1399–1401. Guggenheim’s argument focuses on the lack of specific guidance from rules 
governing lawyers’ professional conduct on how to truly treat children as regular clients. He explains 
that, unlike typical inquiries into lawyers’ roles, the inquiry into children’s lawyers’ roles cannot rest 
on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. This is because the Model Rules are tailored for 
“unimpaired” adults, who are starkly different from children due to differences in capacity and 
communications. Id. Hence, Guggenheim highlights how the Model Rules are deficient in instructing 
lawyers to treat impaired clients, such as children, as similarly to adults as possible. Id. Practically 
speaking, children are too different from adults to fit the same standard. Id.  
 To overcome the lack of guidance highlighted in this passage, several child advocacy experts have 
published practice guides to assist lawyers in catering to the needs of child clients. See Appell, supra 
note 16; HARALAMBIE, supra note 16; PETERS, supra note 16.  
 113. While client-directed advocacy faces some of the same challenges as best-interests advocacy 
regarding the need for lawyer discretion, the key difference is that it errs on the side of allowing 
children to direct their representation. Therefore, in assessing the tradeoffs of both alternatives, though 
neither is flawless, client-directed advocacy at least avoids sweeping in the additional problem of 
wrongfully withholding from children the right to direct their representation. 
 114. See Guggenheim, supra note 40, at 307; Mandelbaum, supra note 105, at 49–53. 
 115. See Guggenheim, supra note 40, at 303. Such a development is counterintuitive in that the 
number of situations calling for children’s lawyers expanded much more rapidly than the definitions 
associated with these lawyers’ role. Id. 












representation in the context in which it takes place—inside the walls of 
family court—provides a reasonable explanation for the bifurcation of 
lawyer roles, the dominance of the best interests attorney, and the ensuing 
attenuation of client-directed child advocacy. 
Family court is designed to achieve rehabilitative and therapeutic 
effects.116 These goals, in turn, have pushed the court to function more 
informally.117 This informal nature is both deeply rooted118 and 
criticized.119 The nature of family court is accompanied by the notion that 
children should be protected not only from the alleged abuse or neglect at 
issue but also from any negative effects of the adversarial process.120 
Because this protective sentiment seeps into all facets of the dependency 
proceeding—from removal of the child from the home through the 
potential termination of parental rights—the very inclusion of the child in 
the proceeding has been cast as harmful.121  
The perceived need for this protective stance in advocating for children 
has helped sustain the predominance of best interests advocacy by 
encouraging it via bifurcated standards. The court’s informality is one of 
its chief characteristics, especially in its dependency proceedings.122 This 
 
 
 116. See infra note 123. 
 117. Social work norms are seen to dominate dependency proceedings. Sinden, supra note 102, at 
353–54. Much of this social work dynamic stems from how Family Court proceedings are generally 
cast as therapeutic, despite their legal ramifications. Id. “[T]he predominance of social work norms and 
discourse creates significant pressure on parents to resolve these cases through non-adversarial, 
informal means. . . . While lawyers’ training steeps them in the discourse of individual rights and . . . 
formal, procedure-bound environments, social workers are . . . trained to value informality over 
formality.” Id. at 353–54.  
 118. See Patricia A. Schene, Past, Present, and Future Roles of Child Protective Services, 
FUTURE OF CHILD., Spring 1998, at 23, 24–29 (describing the roots of family court).  
 119. “[T]he dynamics [of family court] . . . do more than simply push participants to resolve cases 
through negotiated settlement rather than trial. Instead, they serve to devalue and suppress rights talk, 
treating any effort to frame problems in an adversarial context as unmotherly and harmful to the 
child.” Sinden, supra note 102, at 355. Because of the stigma attached to adversarialism in the 
purportedly therapeutic family court proceedings, informality often trumps formality as the ideal 
methodology. Id. 
 120. See Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children and the 
Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 123–29 (1998) (detailing the potential harmful effects of 
adversarial proceedings on children involved in the proceedings). 
 121. See Alicia M. Hehr, Note, A Child Shall Lead Them: Developing and Utilizing Child 
Protection Mediation to Better Serve the Interests of the Child, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 443, 
451–52 (2007) (describing how legalizing human problems through litigation is harmful); Weinstein, 
supra note 120, at 123–29; but see Jacob Ethan Smiles, Note, A Child’s Due Process Right to Legal 
Counsel in Abuse and Neglect Dependency Proceedings, 37 FAM. L.Q. 485, 492 n.49 (2003) 
(contrasting the effects of assigning lawyers for children in commitment proceedings from dependency 
proceedings). 
 122. In other contexts, such as delinquency, the lawyer operates solely as a client-directed attorney 
and hence does not face the same confusion as in dependency proceedings. Furthermore, the 













informality, as it coexists with the establishment and development of 
children’s legal rights, is a significant reason why child representation has 
developed with so much uncertainty. The goals underlying this informal 
system123 have justified our subversion of children’s statutory rights to 
speak and have allowed the prominence of best interests attorneys in child 
representation schemes.124 Indeed, most state statutes appoint best interests 
lawyers as proxies for the child,125 consistent with the goal of maintaining 
a collaborative effort among the parties to correct family problems rather 
than litigating them. In addition to compensating for children’s lack of 
capacity, best interests lawyers also remove the child from an adversarial 
position and align with the ostensibly therapeutic goal126 of achieving a 
common resolution in the child’s best interest.  
B. Implications of Informality’s Support of Best Interests Advocacy 
Criticism of this existing child advocacy system need not derive from 
ideological disagreement with best interests advocacy; rather, it also rests 
 
 
Supreme Court has recognized procedural protections for minors. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31–57 
(1967) (recognizing juveniles’ rights in delinquency cases to notice, counsel, cross-examination, and 
privilege against self-incrimination). The progeny from this case further serves to relieve any 
remaining inconsistencies. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 537–38 (1975) (recognizing 
applicability of the bar against double jeopardy in juvenile delinquency proceedings); In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that delinquency proceedings must function under the “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standard of proof).  
 123. “The history of the nation’s response to child abuse and neglect has been marked by a tension 
between two missions: an emphasis on rescuing children from abusive or neglectful families on the 
one hand, and efforts to support and preserve their families on the other.” Schene, supra note 118, at 
24–29 (delineating the development of the Family Court, beginning with the English Poor Law and 
continuing through child-saving goals and then progressive family therapy goals). The mid-twentieth 
century generated transformation in child protection efforts, moving from a focus in law enforcement 
to a focus in social services. HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 3, at 631. The therapeutic goals 
altered the system from focusing primarily on saving children to focusing on rehabilitating families as 
a means of bettering children’s lives. Id. For a criticism of how such “cooperation” between the state 
and families occurs, see Sinden, supra note 102, at 354. 
 124. For a detailed discussion in support of appointing attorneys to act as guardians ad litem, see 
Harris, supra note 68. 
 125. See REPRESENTING CHILDREN WORLDWIDE, supra note 11. 
 126. But see Sinden, supra note 102, at 354 (criticizing the predominance of social work norms 
over adversarial norms in dependency cases).  
A key word in the prevailing social work discourse is thus “cooperation.” . . . This language 
of “cooperation” cloaks the substantial power differential that exists between the child 
welfare agency and the accused mother. . . . In the child welfare context . . . “cooperation” is 
frequently just a code word for the parent doing whatever the social worker tells her to do. . . .  
 The fallacy, of course, is that this claim treats the “best interests of the child” as some 
objectively determinable absolute, when in fact it is an extremely malleable and subjective 
standard. 
Id.  












on the overall importance of adopting child-centered reforms. Of course, 
best interests attorneys ought not to be dismissed lightly or criticized too 
harshly, as they undertake difficult work with a noble reason in mind. 
Moreover, they are often necessary in particular situations, such as where 
the child clients are nonverbal or infants.127 However, the underpinnings of 
child advocacy128 and the articulated reasons129 for the current trend 
toward client direction serve as a reminder of the need to adopt a child-
centered approach in setting up the system’s default framework. Of course, 
even those who disagree with the Fordham and UNLV recommendations 
can appreciate a new child-centered approach, as it does not necessitate 
endorsement of total client direction. Instead, it provides a significantly 
different methodology, by which children are at the forefront of reform 
efforts. 
In most, if not all, states that adopt a best interests attorney model,130 a 
lawyer may consider the child’s wishes, either because mandated to do so 
or because the lawyer chooses to do so.131 But, in either case, the lawyer is 
not bound to advocate for the attainment of the child’s desires. Even 
children whose best interests lawyers are statutorily mandated to 
communicate the child’s wishes to the court132 do not receive the full 
benefit of client direction. Those statutes generally require only that the 
child’s wishes be communicated, not that they be advocated.133 
Furthermore, children who may actually be capable of articulating their 
wishes and contributing significantly to their representation may be 
assigned best interests lawyers because of reasons such as age or judges’ 
perceptions of the children’s capacity.134 Hence, modern state statutes and 
standards perpetuate the diminishment of children’s voices and the 
amplification of their representatives’ voices. Despite the potentially 
dramatic effects of the proceeding on the child’s life, the child often plays 
only a nominal role in his or her representation and understands very little, 
 
 
 127. But see supra note 10. 
 128. See supra Part II.B. 
 129. See UNLV Conference, supra note 14, at 592–93; Haralambie & Glaser, supra note 89, at 67.  
 130. See REPRESENTING CHILDREN WORLDWIDE, supra note 11; see also note 33. 
 131. See Harris, supra note 68, at 1290–91 (offering support for best interests models by 
explaining how the child’s wishes may still be incorporated into lawyers’ best interests advocacy). 
Harris demonstrates the conditional nature of how and when children’s wishes will affect best interests 
advocacy. Id. 
 132. See supra note 96. 
 133. See supra note 96. 













if anything, regarding the significance of the proceeding.135 A significant 
question to ask, then, is whether it is worth forsaking the child’s full right 
to representation for the sake of clarifying the attorney’s role and 
maintaining informality.136 Though current standards may suggest “yes,” a 
truly child-focused movement would say “no.” 
IV. THE CLIENT-DIRECTED ATTORNEY ROLE BRINGS CHILDREN TO THE 
FOREFRONT 
Following from the foregoing explanation of the underlying causes of 
our fractured system of child representation in dependency proceedings, 
one solution that emerges to mend those fractures is to make all lawyers 
client-directed. Such a reform would help bridge the underlying but 
persistent rift between child-centered goals and the existing efforts to 
legislate. Certainly, establishing a client-directed attorney role is not in 
itself a particularly novel idea. However, this Note seeks to offer another 
justification for it—namely, the need to refocus child advocacy on the 
child and away from the lawyer. This Note further seeks to demonstrate 
how such a role would account for children’s special needs as clients, 
benefit the proceeding as a whole, and strike an appropriate balance 
between formality and informality.  
As an initial matter, reformers cannot supplant the whole family court 
system, and perhaps they should not want to. Some of the informal 
procedures indeed are valuable and relatively untroubling.137 But to fully 
 
 
 135. Those concerned with the best interests lawyer’s role often focus on how the role of the child 
in such representation is minimized.  
At worst, it has led to situations where representatives do not even deem it necessary to meet 
with their child clients. More frequently, it has led to a greatly reduced role for the child, such 
that the child’s wishes are not made known to the court and the child has very little, if any, 
understanding of the court process, his role in it, and what it means to his life. 
Mandelbaum, supra note 105, at 36–37 (footnote omitted).  
 136. For a discussion of the tradeoffs between best interests and client-directed advocacy, see 
infra note 151.  
 137. Family court has developed many informal procedures designed to benefit children. For 
example, in delinquency proceedings, many state statutes offer diversion as an alternative to judicial 
proceedings. See HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 3, at 456–60. Examples of diversion procedures 
include informal probation and peer courts. Id. at 457. The availability of diversion alternatives 
“expresses a conviction that many referrals to court are unnecessary and that the harm done to children 
in many cases outweighs the benefits of judicial action.” Id.  
 Similarly, even when a judicial proceeding occurs in family court, the disposition stage of the 
proceeding is designed to be flexible to accommodate for individual needs. The judge is allowed broad 
discretion to determine what is in the child’s best interest. Id. at 632. The disposition may be tailored 
to provide particular therapy, services, placement, and other multifaceted planning for the child and the 
child’s family needs. Id.  












maintain such a system at the expense of a child’s right to be heard—
particularly when children have so much at stake and often so much to 
say—effectively devalues the child as a party in the proceeding. For better 
or worse, family court functions to keep children as far away as possible 
from the stress of the courtroom. By limiting children’s ability to utilize 
the one mouthpiece they have, family court treats them as only subjects of 
the proceeding, rather than as real parties to it. The universal 
implementation of client-directed child advocates could maintain the other 
relatively informal and rehabilitative features of family court, while 
simultaneously refocusing child advocacy on the child. 
A. Eliminating the Over- and Under-Inclusiveness of Categorizing 
Children, While Accommodating for Those Lacking Capacity 
A reform calling for only client-directed attorneys would carefully 
respond to the concern that too many capable children are being excluded 
from the client-directed category of representation under the current 
bifurcated system.138 It would shift standards away from centering on 
lawyers’ clarity and instead toward focusing primarily on how to enhance 
child participation. This in turn would value children as real parties to the 
legal proceeding, rather than only as the subjects of the underlying 
allegations at issue. Children would direct all issues in their representation 
except only those issues determined by their lawyers to be beyond their 
capacity. Such a discrete framework would replace the all-or-nothing 
approach139 of labeling best interests and client-directed attorneys. 
Moreover, while the potential for attorneys’ misjudgment or bias would 
still exist, it would apply to smaller, isolated decisions that could be 
addressed and analyzed along the way, in contrast to the drastic and 
practically unchangeable determinations otherwise made at the outset of 
the proceeding. Such a stance is part and parcel with Fordham and 
UNLV’s recommendations for child-centered representation. After all, the 
proceeding itself will always center on the child, but to meaningfully 
consider the child as a party, the child’s representation must focus on the 
child’s wishes.140 Such a reform would transform the current prophylactic 
approach,141 which errs on the side of limiting the number of client-
 
 
 138. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.  
 139. This reference to an all-or-nothing approach addresses the type of approach taken by the 
AAML Standards. See supra text accompanying notes 86–88. 
 140. See Fordham Conference, supra note 13, pt. II.A; UNLV Conference, supra note 14, pt. I.C. 













directed attorneys, into a new prophylactic approach that errs on the side 
of empowering children.  
This new approach would not require a blind eye toward children’s 
diminished capacity, which is often a subject of great concern among 
advocates of the best interests model. In circumstances where an attorney 
determined that the child had diminished capacity142 and thereby could not 
direct a particular piece of the representation, the attorney could counsel 
the child143 or substitute judgment, within the limits of ethical conduct.144 
Because child representation is such a specialty, specific practice 
guidelines also exist to compensate for situations where adult-focused 
ethical rules appear deficient.145 For instance, both the Fordham146 and 
 
 
 142. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.14 cmts. 1–4 (2002).  
 143. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 2.1 (2002). Other practice guides designed 
specifically for children’s lawyers provide a framework for counseling children as well. See Appell, 
supra note 16; HARALAMBIE, supra note 16; PETERS, supra note 16. These specialty sources generally 
encourage lawyers to, among other things, become involved in the children’s community and family 
lives and learn how to listen to children before inserting personal opinions or values.  
 144. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.14 (2002). But see Katner, supra note 41, at 
111–15 (describing the limitations of Model Rule 1.14 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
which governs clients with diminished capacity, as applied to children). Fordham’s recommendations 
also caution how Rule 1.14 may be inadequate: “Further study should be given to . . . whether Rule 
1.14 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct . . . adequately addresses the representation of 
children. . . . [C]onsideration might be given to amending [it] to delete the term ‘minority,’ and to 
adopting a separate Model Rule to address the representation of children.” Fordham Conference, supra 
note 13, at 1314.  
 Though criticism of Rule 1.14 is well grounded, it should not be interpreted as to completely 
undermine lawyers’ ability to apply ethical rules to client-directed child advocacy. Katner argues that 
the ABA Standards provide guidance to supplement Rule 1.14. Katner, supra note 41, at 104–05. 
Other scholars have produced other practice guides specifically for child advocates. See Appell, supra 
note 16; HARALAMBIE, supra note 16; PETERS, supra note 16. These manuals, though not always 
explicitly concerning ethical professional behavior, provide significant guidelines to steer lawyers’ 
conduct during representation. 
 Moreover, the profession’s perception of how ethics applies to child representation is also shaped 
by the profession’s notions of what appropriate child representation entails. This is clearly articulated 
in the first sentence of the UNLV recommendations’ introduction: “During the nearly half century that 
legal norms have mandated appointment of counsel or other representation for children in legal 
proceedings, the children's attorneys’ community has come to the conclusion that ethical legal 
representation of children is synonymous with allowing the child to direct representation.” UNLV 
Conference, supra note 14, at 592. 
 145. See Appell, supra note 16; HARALAMBIE, supra note 16; PETERS, supra note 16. 
 146. Fordham Conference, supra note 13, at 1301 (“The lawyer should not serve as the child’s 
guardian ad litem or in another role insofar as the role includes responsibilities inconsistent with those 
of a lawyer for the child. The role of the child’s lawyer will vary, however, depending on whether the 
child has capacity to direct the representation. The lawyer for a child who is not impaired . . . must 
allow the child to set the goals of the representation as would an adult client.”). For Fordham’s 
guidelines regarding children who have capacity to direct their representation, see id. at 1302–05, 
1308.  
 Part IV of the Fordham Recommendations, which addresses nonverbal and preverbal children, 
first explains that “[a]lthough other issues remain unresolved, the profession has reached a consensus 












UNLV147 recommendations provide guidance for lawyers dealing with 
children, and several scholars and experts in the child advocacy field have 
written books, articles, and practice guides148 to address this very 
difficulty. These guidelines address how lawyers can determine when 
children lack the requisite capacity to make certain decisions.149  
Withholding decision-making power from children in such situations is 
far different from withholding it outright; it reverses the prophylactic 
effect of the existing scheme. In this situation, the goal is to maximize 
child participation whenever possible, even piecemeal, throughout the 
proceeding. This is distinct from existing standards that simplify a 
lawyer’s role from the outset and thereby risk unnecessary exclusion of the 
child’s input at later stages. Furthermore, it involves essentially the same 
determination as is presently accepted to categorize a child,150 only it 
would be made more discretely with regard to specific instances rather 
than sweepingly for all issues.151 Though requiring an arguably more 
complex set of tasks for lawyers, the increased attention to children as 
individuals would reinforce their presence at the center of the 
representation. Thus, a reform calling for a client-directed attorney reaches 
 
 
that lawyers for children currently exercise too much discretion in making decisions on behalf of their 
clients including ‘best interests’ determinations.” Id. at 1309. For Fordham’s guidelines for lawyers 
representing clients with diminished capacity to direct representation, see id. at 1308–11. 
 147. See UNLV Conference, supra note 14, at 593–600. 
 148. See Appell, supra note 16; HARALAMBIE, supra note 16; PETERS, supra note 16. 
 149. See Fordham Conference, supra note 13, pt. V; UNLV Conference, supra note 14, pt. 
IV.A.2.a. 
 150.  NCCUSL ACT, supra note 50, at 16. 
 151. Some scholars are wary of lawyers potentially exerting too much influence over children in a 
client-directed relationship because of children’s inherent diminished capacity. See Duquette, supra 
note 69, at 455–56. Others voice that having lawyers receive direction until they determine that they 
must substitute judgment creates an unworkable hybrid attorney role. See Katner, supra note 41, at 
103–04, 109–10. Scholars who express such concerns are essentially concerned with unethical 
conduct. Remarkably, however, the profession expressed at the UNLV Conference that “the children’s 
attorneys’ community has come to the conclusion that ethical legal representation of children is 
synonymous with allowing the child to direct representation.” UNLV Conference, supra note 14, at 
592. Because of children’s inherently limited capacity, a natural condition to allowing for the 
profession’s consensus is to allow the lawyers some means of supplementing the client’s direction. All 
of these considerations must be viewed against the backdrop of the child representation debate. 
Weighing the benefits and dangers of best interests representation against the benefits and dangers of 
client-directed representation may generally lead to a variety of arguments and conclusions. But in the 
context of determining how states should structure lawyers’ roles, states must specifically consider 
what exactly they should strive to achieve, in addition to considering general ethical issues. Fordham, 
UNLV, practice guidelines, and scholarship articulate a view that has been reinforced for more than a 
decade: increase child direction and participation in legal representation. Hence, weighing both of 
these options in this light underscores how only the client-directed option is accompanied by 













the heart of the underlying disparity in child-centered and lawyer-centered 
models.  
B. Advancement of Well-Reasoned Results  
In addition to necessitating an open lawyer-client relationship, the goal 
of maximizing child participation entails incorporation of the child’s views 
into the judge’s deliberation. This would provide the child a meaningful 
opportunity to participate in the conversation about his or her life, just as 
the parents and state participate. As a result, the judge would receive a 
greater wealth of information upon which to decide the case—information 
unavailable from any other source but the child.152 Moreover, the child’s 
lawyer would merely provide a third perspective to the case, which would 
not necessarily influence the judge any more than the state’s or parents’ 
lawyers might.153 The judge would still be expected to arrive at his or her 
own best interests decision154 consistent with the rehabilitative and 
protective goals of family court.  
Along with promoting judges’ consideration of children’s perspectives, 
a client-directed attorney role would also increase the quality of 
information lawyers would gather from their clients and hence enhance the 
attorney-child relationship. Lawyers would be obligated to gather 
information to accurately represent the child instead of deciding best 
interests based on subjective perceptions.155 Commenting on current 
practice, Professor Guggenheim has explained that, because child clients 
are neglected and abused, lawyers often view them automatically as 
children who need to be rescued or protected. For instance,  
[w]hen children are accused of wrongdoing, lawyers tend to see 
their principal function to defend them. However, when the state 
labels the children as “victims,” their lawyers no longer see a need 
to protect their clients from the state. Instead, they see a need to 
 
 
 152. Haralambie, supra note 66, at 1282.  
 153. Regarding the “fear that the judge will simply defer to the child’s attorney’s position,” 
Haralambie and Glaser argue “the proper remedy . . . is to educate judges about . . . their mandatory 
obligation to exercise independent discretion, not to remove the advocacy for the most affected and 
least powerful person in the case: the child.” Haralambie & Glaser, supra note 89, at 92–93 (footnotes 
omitted). 
 154. The standard for judges’ decisions in dependency cases is to determine what is “in the best 
interests of the child.” See HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 3, at 632. 
 155. See Guggenheim, supra note 40, at 307. 












protect them from the people whom the state has identified as 
harmful to their clients.156 
In such situations, lawyers tend to step out of their prescribed roles as 
attorneys and merge into the role of protectors, thereby effectively siding 
with the state in terms of what they advocate. Of course, not all lawyers 
are prone to such behavior, and indeed some lawyers may even lean more 
heavily towards reunification with families whenever possible. However, 
the existence of this alternative stance does not overcome the problems 
with allowing lawyers to shift their advocacy based on subjective 
perceptions of abuse and neglect cases.  
C. Accounting for Both the Benefits and Drawbacks of the Adversarial 
System 
The client-directed role for lawyers would also provide the benefits of 
the adversarial system without damaging family court’s protective 
procedural view of children. American courts operate on a formal 
adversarial basis for a number of reasons, including accuracy, protection 
against bias, and credibility.157 Furthermore, “the adversarial process 
grants the parties control over the process and the decision-maker, whether 
a judge or a jury, controls over the decision.”158 These underlying policies 
support all types of court proceedings, regardless of the issue. Particularly 
in family court, where biases, stereotypes, and assumptions159 infamously 
and easily drift into deciding sensitive, family issues, the rights of the 
parties deserve, at minimum, a guard against slanted analysis. Such slanted 
analysis would arise not only among the parties to the case but also quite 
foreseeably between the child and the child’s representative. 
The concerns regarding protecting children from the stress and 
potential harm from the adversarial process, which are subsumed within 
the philosophical bases of family court, must be considered relative to the 
appropriate context. Children who experience abuse or neglect, or children 
who have been subject to state intervention even when no findings of 
 
 
 156. Martin Guggenheim, How Children’s Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6 NEV. L.J. 805, 809–10 
(2006). 
 157. Sinden, supra note 102, at 379 (“The formal adversarial process is designed to produce 
accurate decisions by bringing out all relevant facts and limiting bias and prejudice. . . . [E]ach side is 
motivated to ferret out all the evidence that supports its position. . . . [P]arties’ adoption of a 
conciliatory stance . . . raises the danger that they will accept statements uncritically.”). 
 158. Gerald W. Hardcastle, Adversarialism and the Family Court: A Family Court Judge’s 
Perspective, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 57, 64–65 (2005).  













abuse transpire in court, are subject to emotional trauma. They are brought 
into the system by third parties,160 who are then in a position to shape the 
children’s entire family lives.161 Given the existing disruption to the 
children’s lives, the lingering question is whether the adversarial process 
contributes an undue level of additional trauma, enough to override the 
value of child-directed representation. Of course, the potential effects of 
litigation on a child ought not to be understated. However, these effects 
must be weighed against the benefits of the adversarial process, namely 
the added protection against improper representation. Additionally, 
allowing children to participate in the adversarial process may lessen the 
helplessness associated with trauma, and even the distrust of the system, if 
they know they at least have a voice in determining the outcome. 
Weighing the costs and benefits associated with the existing system and 
the client-directed attorney model, the latter alternative emerges as one 
whose benefits justify its costs. 
D. Freeing the Attorney of External Influences 
Requiring the client-directed approach would also effectively free 
lawyers from the pressures from the state or the court that often arise in 
family court proceedings. While most standards seek to clarify the 
ambiguities in child representation by separating the roles of client-
directed attorneys and best interests attorneys, they do not account for the 
conflicts inherent in the best interests role itself.162 Once the lawyer 
becomes a best interests advocate, the lawyer often faces added pressures 
to advocate in a certain manner, regardless of what the client desires or 
what the attorney may personally think.163 For instance, the attorney might 
 
 
 160. Abuse and neglect cases arise after the state agency receives a report of alleged abuse or 
neglect, inquires into the situation, takes actions it finds necessary to correct the problem, and finally 
determines that such actions were insufficient and therefore require court intervention. HARRIS & 
TEITELBAUM, supra note 3, at 632. 
 161. The dispositional options, at the hands of judges and other individuals outside of the family, 
range from family reunification to termination of parental rights. Id. at 655, 661. 
 162. See Guggenheim, supra note 73, at 81. Guggenheim has suggested that allowing a child’s 
attorney to make a best interests determination for the child would practically result in that lawyer 
usurping the judge’s role. 
 Additionally, Guggenheim has highlighted how “[t]he irony in the theoretical arguments over 
whether children’s lawyers should advocate for what their client wants or for what is in their best 
interests is that were children’s lawyers ever to truly become powerful voices for what their clients 
want, they would become deeply opposed to state intervention.” Guggenheim, supra note 156, at 833. 
 163. See Guggenheim, supra note 156; see also id. at 824 (detailing a case, In re Jennifer G., 481 
N.Y.S.2d 141 (1984), appealed after remand 487 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1985), in which a lawyer was 
chastised and removed because he advocated for his child clients to go home after acknowledging that 












risk his or her reputation or face discipline by the court for advocating a 
client’s wishes which pose a potential threat to the client.164 Such an 
affiliation is dangerous in terms of its procedural effect on the proceeding, 
because lawyers may develop a tendency to over-filter what they advocate 
and hence may leave out significant information from the client.165 A 
similar mode of analysis has been applied to the role of the prosecutor in 
delinquency cases.166 Prosecutors in delinquency cases struggle to balance 
their parens patriae obligation to protect the child with their role as state 
prosecutors trying to establish a substantive delinquency case against the 
child.167 Practically then, if not formally, such a situation in the context of 
a dependency proceeding may result in not only children losing a zealous 
advocate but also the state gaining an extra player on its side.168 Relatedly, 
 
 
such a return would present some risk to the children). Neither the case nor Guggenheim’s 
commentary specify the age of the children or the precise type of advocacy the lawyer had undertaken. 
Jennifer G.’s lawyer’s simple advocacy for the return of children to their mother's custody 
(advocacy grounded enough to persuade the trial judge) greatly damaged his reputation. . . . 
He also was a powerful reminder to all of the other children’s advocates in New York City. 
The clear warning issued from the . . . appellate court . . . was simply too strong not to be 
noticed: . . .  
 You place yourselves and your reputations at risk if you do anything which appellate 
courts will construe as placing children at risk. Moreover, if you carefully read the decisions 
we routinely announce, we do not perceive any serious risk to children being removed from 
their parents, but we are quick to find substantial risk when children are permitted to remain 
at home. 
Guggenheim, supra note 156, at 824. 
 164. See Guggenheim, supra note 156, at 819–22, 824. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Sally T. Green, Prosecutorial Waiver into Adult Criminal Court: A Conflict of Interests 
Violation Amounting to the States’ Legislative Abrogation of Juveniles’ Due Process Rights, 110 
PENN. ST. L. REV. 233 (2005).  
 167. Id. at 234–35. 
[W]e must consider closely any state legislative scheme that, on one hand, promotes the 
protective role of the state over juveniles under the doctrine of parens patriae, but on the 
other hand, constructs a system whereby the very same state officer (the prosecutor) who 
performs this role also decides, by his own sagacity, that the juvenile should be tried as an 
adult. . . . Therein lies an inherent conflict that violates basic principles of due process that are 
afforded any criminal defendant, much less juvenile defendants. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). While dependency proceedings have not realized the same due process rights 
as delinquency or criminal cases, best interests lawyers face similar internal conflicts as delinquency 
prosecutors.  
 168. Guggenheim explained the practical effects of such a bias on the relationship between an 
attorney and child-client:  
In my experience, many adults connected with child protective cases treat children’s 
expressed preferences quite differently, depending on what the child says. When children say 
they want to go home, that wish is often received by adults the same way editors treat a story 
about a dog biting a man—they aren’t going to run with it. On the other hand . . . [w]hen, but 














if lawyers are to independently determine the best interests of their clients, 
then they may begin to usurp bits of the judge’s role.169 In determining 
what to advocate as the best interests of the child, lawyers have to interpret 
the law and engage in fact-finding as judges would. Freeing the attorney 
from these unwritten yet persisting obligations would increase 
commitment to zealous representation while discarding the gray areas in 
which lawyers would otherwise have to decide what they “should” 
advocate. Such liberation would allow lawyers to focus fully on their child 
clients. 
CONCLUSION 
Dependency proceedings are turbulent and often life-changing. While 
some proceedings end in relatively non-controversial resolution, some 
may result in harm to the child or termination of the parents’ rights. 
Children possess emotions and opinions the same as any adult party to the 
proceeding, and they can be invaluable sources of information. The 
manner in which the system addresses and handles the views of the child 
is critical to legitimizing child representation.  
Despite the developing nature of children’s rights and the increasingly 
broad trend toward supporting client-directed advocacy, legislative efforts 
have centered on clarifying lawyers’ roles instead of seeking methods by 
which to optimize children’s participation. Hence, children have been cast 
in the shadows of reforms that purport to enhance their representation. 
Though some children may be entirely incapable of expressing their 
wishes on a particular issue, not all children need to be grouped into a 
presumption of total incapacity. Family court norms of informality and 
general concerns regarding children’s capacity dominate the current 
system. These norms promote the existing prevalence of lawyer-focused 
models and thereby insufficient focus on children. In light of this context, 
requiring a client-directed role for lawyers in the midst of other informal 
structures would help correct the lawyer-focused distortion that has so 
widely affected reform efforts. A movement to enhance child 
 
 
Guggenheim, Counseling Counsel for Children, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1488, 1503 (1999). 
 169. Guggenheim, supra note 73, at 81; see also Spinak, supra note 28, at 1390 (“[Best interests] 
lawyers will persist in usurping the role of the judge in determining best interests and undermine the 
full presentation and consideration of relevant information, including the child’s counseled wishes and 
legal interests.”). 












representation requires a focus on the child, consideration of the child, and 
respect for the child. 
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